ÿØÿà JFIF    ÿÛ „  ( %"1!%)+...383,7(-.+  -+++--++++---+-+-----+---------------+---+-++7-----ÿÀ  ß â" ÿÄ     ÿÄ H    !1AQaq"‘¡2B±ÁÑð#R“Ò Tbr‚²á3csƒ’ÂñDS¢³$CÿÄ   ÿÄ %  !1AQa"23‘ÿÚ   ? ôÿ ¨pŸªáÿ —åYõõ\?àÒü©ŠÄï¨pŸªáÿ —åYõõ\?àÓü©ŠÄá 0Ÿªáÿ Ÿå[úƒ ú®ði~TÁbqÐ8OÕpÿ ƒOò¤Oè`–RÂáœá™êi€ßÉ< FtŸI“öÌ8úDf´°å}“¾œ6  öFá°y¥jñÇh†ˆ¢ã/ÃÐ:ªcÈ "Y¡ðÑl>ÿ ”ÏËte:qž\oäŠe÷󲍷˜HT4&ÿ ÓÐü6ö®¿øþßèô Ÿ•7Ñi’•j|“ñì>b…þS?*Óôÿ ÓÐü*h¥£ír¶ü UãSç‚Ÿ[AÐaè[ûª•õ&õj?†Éö+EzP—WeÒírJFt ‘BŒ†Ï‡%#tE Øz ¥OÛ«!1›üä±Í™%ºÍãö]°î(–:@<‹ŒÊö×òÆt¦ãº+‡¦%ÌÁ²h´OƒJŒtMÜ>ÀÜÊw3Y´•牋4ǍýʏTì>œú=Íwhyë,¾Ôò×õ¿ßÊa»«þˆѪQ|%6ž™A õ%:øj<>É—ÿ Å_ˆCbõ¥š±ý¯Ýƒï…¶|RëócÍf溪“t.СøTÿ *Ä¿-{†çàczůŽ_–^XþŒ±miB[X±d 1,é”zEù»& î9gœf™9Ð'.;—™i}!ôšåîqêÛ٤ёý£½ÆA–àôe"A$˝Úsäÿ ÷Û #°xŸëí(l »ý3—¥5m! rt`†0~'j2(]S¦¦kv,ÚÇ l¦øJA£Šƒ J3E8ÙiŽ:cÉžúeZ°€¯\®kÖ(79«Ž:¯X”¾³Š&¡* ….‰Ž(ÜíŸ2¥ª‡×Hi²TF¤ò[¨íÈRëÉ䢍mgÑ.Ÿ<öäS0í„ǹÁU´f#Vß;Õ–…P@3ío<ä-±»Ž.L|kªÀê›fÂ6@»eu‚|ÓaÞÆŸ…¨ááå>åŠ?cKü6ùTÍÆ”†sĤÚ;H2RÚ†õ\Ö·Ÿn'¾ ñ#ºI¤Å´%çÁ­‚â7›‹qT3Iï¨ÖÚ5I7Ë!ÅOóŸ¶øÝñØôת¦$Tcö‘[«Ö³šÒ';Aþ ¸èíg A2Z"i¸vdÄ÷.iõ®§)¿]¤À†–‡É&ä{V¶iŽ”.Ó×Õÿ û?h¬Mt–íª[ÿ Ñÿ ÌV(í}=ibÔ¡›¥¢±b Lô¥‡piη_Z<‡z§èŒ)iÖwiÇ 2hÙ3·=’d÷8éŽ1¦¸c¤µ€7›7Ø ð\á)} ¹fËí›pAÃL%âc2 í§æQz¿;T8sæ°qø)QFMð‰XŒÂ±N¢aF¨…8¯!U  Z©RÊ ÖPVÄÀÍin™Ì-GˆªÅËŠ›•zË}º±ŽÍFò¹}Uw×#ä5B¤{î}Ð<ÙD é©¤&‡ïDbàÁôMÁ." ¤‡ú*õ'VŽ|¼´Úgllº¼klz[Æüï÷Aób‡Eÿ dÑ»Xx9ÃÜ£ÁT/`¼¸vI±Ýµ·Ë‚“G³þ*Ÿû´r|*}<¨îºœ @¦mÄ’M¹”.œ«Y–|6ÏU¤jç¥ÕÞqO ˜kDÆÁ¨5ÿ š;Њ¦¦€GÙk \ –Þ=â¼=SͧµªS°ÚÍpÜãQűÀõ¬?ÃÁ1Ñ•õZà?hóœ€ L¦l{Y*K˜Ù›zc˜–ˆâ ø+¾ ­-Ök¥%ùEÜA'}ˆ><ÊIè“bpÍ/qÞâvoX€w,\úªò6Z[XdÒæ­@Ö—€$òJí#é>'°Ú ôª˜<)4ryÙ£|óAÅn5žêŸyÒäMÝ2{"}‰–¤l÷ûWX\l¾Á¸góÉOÔ /óñB¤f¸çñ[.P˜ZsÊË*ßT܈§QN¢’¡¨§V¼(Üù*eÕ“”5T¨‹Âê¥FŒã½Dü[8'Ò¥a…Ú¶k7a *•›¼'Ò·\8¨ª\@\õ¢¦íq+DÙrmÎ…_ªæ»ŠÓœ¡¯’Ré9MÅ×D™lælffc+ŒÑ,ý™ÿ ¯þǤ=Å’Á7µ÷ÚÛ/“Ü€ñýã¼àí¾ÕÑ+ƒ,uµMâÀÄbm:ÒÎPæ{˜Gz[ƒ¯«® KHà`ßØŠéí¯P8Aq.C‰ à€kòpj´kN¶qô€…Õ,ÜNŠª-­{Zö’æû44‰sŽè‰îVíRœÕm" 6?³D9¡ÇTíÅꋇ`4«¸ÝÁô ï’ýorqКÇZ«x4Žâéþuïf¹µö[P ,Q£éaX±`PÉÍZ ¸äYúg üAx ’6Lê‚xÝÓ*äQ  Ï’¨hÍ =²,6ï#rÃ<¯–£»ƒ‹,–ê•€ aÛsñ'%Æ"®ÛüìBᝠHÚ3ß°©$“XnœÖ’î2ËTeûìxîß ¦å¿çÉ ðK§þ{‘t‚Ϋ¬jéîZ[ ”š7L¥4VÚCE×]m¤Øy”ä4-dz£œ§¸x.*ãÊÊ b÷•h:©‡¦s`BTÁRû¾g⻩‹jø sF¢àJøFl‘È•Xᓁà~*j¯ +(ÚÕ6-£¯÷GŠØy‚<Ç’.F‹Hœw(+)ÜÜâÈzÄäT§FߘãÏ;DmVœ3Àu@mÚüXÝü•3B¨òÌÁÛ<·ÃÜ z,Ì@õÅ·d2]ü8s÷IôÞ¯^Ç9¢u„~ëAŸï4«M? 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As this regularly leads to exploitable flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage. This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: * https://grsecurity.net/ * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ menu "Memory initialization" config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern) choice prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry" default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT default INIT_STACK_NONE help This option enables initialization of stack variables at function entry time. This has the possibility to have the greatest coverage (since all functions can have their variables initialized), but the performance impact depends on the function calling complexity of a given workload's syscalls. This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially uninitialized variables. The selected class will be initialized before use in a function. config INIT_STACK_NONE bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)" help Disable automatic stack variable initialization. This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information exposures. config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER bool "zero-init structs marked for userspace (weak)" depends on GCC_PLUGINS select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK help Zero-initialize any structures on the stack containing a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information exposures, like CVE-2013-2141: https://git.kernel.org/linus/b9e146d8eb3b9eca config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF bool "zero-init structs passed by reference (strong)" depends on GCC_PLUGINS depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1) select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK help Zero-initialize any structures on the stack that may be passed by reference and had not already been explicitly initialized. This can prevent most classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information exposures, like CVE-2017-1000410: https://git.kernel.org/linus/06e7e776ca4d3654 As a side-effect, this keeps a lot of variables on the stack that can otherwise be optimized out, so combining this with CONFIG_KASAN_STACK can lead to a stack overflow and is disallowed. config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)" depends on GCC_PLUGINS depends on !(KASAN && KASAN_STACK=1) select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK help Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed by reference and had not already been explicitly initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information exposures. config INIT_STACK_ALL bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)" depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT help Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information exposures, even variables that were warned to have been left uninitialized. endchoice config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE bool "Report forcefully initialized variables" depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy help This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings. config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls" depends on GCC_PLUGINS depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK help This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving the stack initialized to the poison value, which both reduces the lifetime of any sensitive stack contents and reduces potential for uninitialized stack variable exploits or information exposures (it does not cover functions reaching the same stack depth as prior functions during the same syscall). This blocks most uninitialized stack variable attacks, with the performance impact being driven by the depth of the stack usage, rather than the function calling complexity. The performance impact on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it. This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: * https://grsecurity.net/ * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK" default 100 range 0 4096 depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK help The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes). It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter. If unsure, leave the default value 100. config STACKLEAK_METRICS bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system" depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK depends on PROC_FS help If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in the /proc file system. In particular, /proc//stack_depth shows the maximum kernel stack consumption for the current and previous syscalls. Although this information is not precise, it can be useful for estimating the STACKLEAK performance impact for your workloads. config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing" depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK help This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default" help This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0". When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic workloads have measured as high as 7%. config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default" help This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0". Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled, all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced, as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents. The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%. endmenu endmenu